America’s attitude and strategy in the Indochina War: An overview of developments to escalation

After the end of World War II, the world began at the beginning of the Cold War, an era characterized by ideological contrasts, political tensions and military conflicts between the US and USSR superpowers. In this context, the Indochina region also became the focus of global strategy and interests. At first the AmericanForeign policy with regard to Indochina relatively reserved and hesitant, as the US focused on the local situation, especially within the framework of its global goals. The United States was mainly concerned with consolidating its Cold War position, securing European stability and expanding its alliances. In the course of the strategy, developments were retainedIn Indochina, initially in the background, in order to actively influence later – in the course of growing tensions and military escalations. The following decades were characterized by a large number of political, military and diplomatic decisions that ultimately resulted in the Vietnam War. A deeper understanding of this development requires a consideration of the respectivepolitical interests, international relations and the strategic objectives that the US pursued in the context of the conflict.

The initial US behavior: restraint and influence in colonial environment

Below the great geopolitical and global economic visions that shaped post-war politics, the United States initially showed little interest in directly interfering with the political upheavals in Indochina. Rather, Washington focused on cautious influence on the French colonial rulers to persuade them to reformFrench colonial rule should gradually weaken. The aim was to promote the emergence of western-oriented nationalist movements in Vietnam without completely destabilizing French control. At this point, it was largely undisputed in the US Department of State that Ho Chi Minh was the most important personality in Vietnam. It was recognized thatThere was no serious national alternative to him, and considered him primarily a nationalist who fought for the independence of his country. There was no evidence of Ho Chi Minh’s direct connections to Moscow or the Soviet Union, but its importance in American thinking was often put into perspective. Many in Washington believed that the lack of contacts with MoscowJust mean that Stalin Ho believed in his sphere of influence and didn’t need him as a leader. This assessment led to American foreign policy getting into a dilemma again and again: On the one hand, the end of European colonial rule, the right of people of the peoples, was demanded and worked cautiously on decolonization. On the other hand, one shy away from itdirect intervention and pressure on the European powers because the danger of an escalation was feared. Careful attitude was predominant, especially among European colonial powers such as France, Great Britain and the Netherlands. In addition, American politics was always hesitant to make contact with the communist nationalists in the emerging “third world”tie, which further exacerbated the tensions between the various political objectives.

French efforts and their failure in Vietnam

The French attempts to establish an alternative, political leadership in Vietnam that were acceptable to them, were characterized by considerable difficulties from the start. The main character, who eventually publicly agreed to lead a French-controlled government, was Emperor Bao Dai. In March 1949, it was agreed under the so-called Elysée Agreement that FranceVietnam would make concessions in the economic field in return for a so-called “independence”. However, this independence was extremely limited, as foreign and defense policy remained in the hands of France. In addition, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia had to join the French Union, which furtherweakened. The promise of letting Vietnam become independent was actually put into perspective. The Bao Dais government was shaped by forces that still maintained close ties to France to secure economic benefits. This “head of state” could not represent a real nationalistically motivated counterpart to the Viet Minh. Bao Dai, who most of the time at theCôte d’Azur lived and resided in Vietnam only in the remote resort of Dalat, was hardly familiar with the problems of the Vietnamese people. He did not maintain contacts with the peasant population that made up the majority of the population and was largely removed from the political realities in his own country.

China’s influence and the American reaction in 1949

The decisive turning point in regional politics was Mao Zedong’s victory over Tschiang Kai-shek in the China War in 1949 and the flight of the national Chinese government to Taiwan. These events had profound effects on the Indochina political situation in the United States. In Congress in Washington, the Truman administration was increasingly responsible for the losscriticized China to the communists. The opposition accused the government of not having adequately supported Tschiang Kai-schek and that it was too hesitant to fight communism. These allegations were made primarily in connection with the general fear of a communist conspiracy in the USA. The fear was intensified by the ongoing investigations of the HouseUN-American Activities Committee (HUAC), which checked numerous citizens for possible communist contacts. The atmosphere was characterized by distrust and panic, which was intensified by the Korean War between 1950 and 1954. Senator Joseph McCarthy conducted an ominous “witch hunt” on former communists, intellectuals and liberals, which reflects the domestic political situation in theUSA in an alarming state. The domestic political climate demanded a determined and aggressive foreign policy to curb the advance of communism and to ensure national security.

Recognition of the Communist Powers and the US Strategy

In 1950, the world communist power made another important decision: both the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union recognized the Viet Minh as the legitimate government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This was the obvious and dangerous situation in Washington, the close cooperation between China, the Soviet Union and the Vietnamese communists.In response, the US followed on February 7, 1950 and recognized the “State of Vietnam” under Emperor Bao Dai officially as an independent state within the French Union. This decision was made just a few days after the French Parliament had ratified the Elysée Agreement. In March 1950, the Truman administration began, providing military support to theFrench War in Indochina. She transferred $15 million in military aid to strengthen the French forces. With this diplomatic recognition, the United States de facto legitimized French colonial rule in Vietnam. This created a complex political structure: in addition to the French administration, there was a second governmentalso claimed full control over Vietnam. Both governments were legitimized by different powers – the West and the Eastern Bloc – and received support.

The decision for Bao Dai and the domestic political tensions

The American decision to support Bao Dai was anything but lightly made. The Foreign Ministry was aware that the former emperor was not a real counterweight to Ho Chi Minh. In addition, it was clear that building a real, nationalist alternative would only have been possible if France had a profound liberalization of itscolonial policy and would have given the Vietnamese realistic perspectives on independence. But in view of the dramatic defeats in China and the tense domestic political situation after the loss of China, the American leadership ultimately decided on the less risky scenario. Bao Dai and the French allies were in the role of Western defendersvalues and social models. In American perception, the Viet Minh movement, which fought against French colonial rule, turned into a global conspiracy of communism, which manifested itself in Vietnam. This has lifted the conflict into a larger geopolitical dimension.

The NSC-68: The Strategic Foundation of the Cold War

A significant document that significantly influenced American post-war policy is the NSC-68 strategy papers developed by the National Security Council (NSC) and was primarily written by Paul Nitze, the head of the political planning staff at the Foreign Ministry. The document confirmed the basic assumptions of American foreign and security policy since 1947,however, was subjected to a critical reassessment after the successful test of the Soviet atomic bomb in September 1949. The NSC-68 began with a harrowing statement: the problems facing the United States are huge and touched not only the existence of the American Republic, but the entire culture. The aim of the Soviet Union isAbsolute world domination, and she plans in the near future to extend her power to all of Eurasia. Therefore, it is necessary to first push back the Soviet influence at the edges, i.e. in the peripheries. Various means should be used: massive upgrading, development aid, military cooperation, hidden operations of the secret services, psychologicalWarfare and the quick resolution of economic problems in Japan and Western Europe. The paper did not demand an open large-scale war scenario or a nuclear war, but rather an offensive policy of “liberation” and deterrence. The US should be able to thwart local Soviet steps through local actions worldwide. for Southeast Asia was discussed in NSC-68 and other analyzesstipulated that the entire region was the goal of communist expansion. Conquering a country would automatically lead to infiltrations in neighboring countries, which would ultimately result in communist regimes everywhere. In this strategic zero-sum game, there was little room for nuances: there were only friends and enemies, and anyone who didn’t clearly assign themselves to a side was considered to beclassified suspiciously. “Neutralism” was a swear word in this context.

The Korean War: Confirmation of Strategies and Escalation

Only a few months after the release of NSC-68, the danger of communist expansionism became visible in reality. In June 1950, North Korea, supported by Stalin and Mao, attacked the south of the peninsula. This attack confirmed the US Department of Foreign Affairs’ assessments and led to the focus being even more on Southeast Asia.France, which was involved in the Indochin War, was urgently dependent on American support to wage war. In 1949, the conflict had already cost France 167 million francs – a sum that was urgently needed for the reconstruction of France. Between 1950 and 1954, a total of $2.76 billion flowed from the USA to France and Vietnam.This included 1800 armored vehicles, 31,000 jeeps, 361,000 handguns, machine guns, two aircraft carriers and 500 aircraft. In 1952, the Americans were still responsible for 40% of the war costs, but by 1954 this proportion rose to 80%. Economic support for the Vietnamese government, on the other hand, remained relatively low and totaledonly about $50 million.

Military course and the failure of the French strategy

Despite the massive military support, the French forces were unable to achieve decisive successes in the war against the Viet Minh. By the end of 1950, control of large parts of Vietnam had been lost, and General Giap made a decisive strategic breakthrough completely squeezing the French from the Chinese-Vietnamese border. this oneSuccess enabled Chinese supporters to send weapons and staff to Vietnam unhindered. As a result of these developments, military leadership was replaced in Paris. But even the charismatic general Jean de Lattre de Tassigny could only achieve temporary successes. After each victory, Vietnamese guerrilla fighters returned to the villages, making themNocturnal death zones for French troops and supporters of the Bao Dai government. The loss of his only son in the fight and his own cancer ended the general’s commitment within a year. The French strategy of building a pro-Western Vietnamese army and “Vietnamize” the war was largely unsuccessful. By the end of 1952, theFrench troops to mourn more than 90,000 victims, including prisoners, wounded and dead. The French public had become tired of the “dirty war” and the high costs of the National Assembly grew. Worrying also increased in Washington as the French Vietnam War increasingly became a proxy war between East and West: FranceDefended the West in Indochina while the US was active in the Korean War. It was therefore two fronts in the global fight against communism.

From restraint to escalation

Overall, it can be said that the American attitude has undergone a development over the years. Initially, people were rather skeptical and reserved, but with increasing escalation in the region and the intensifying global conflict, support for France and direct interference in the Indochina war became increasingly clear.The situation in the USA, the fear of communist expansion and the strategic considerations of the Cold War led to Vietnam increasingly becoming the focus of American foreign policy. The interplay between internal insecurity, global interests and military strategy shaped the development that ultimately led to the Vietnam War – a conflict that continues to this day.and significantly influenced the history of the Cold War.