Vietnam in the Cold War: The road to crisis and the undesirable developments of the South Vietnamese regime

The Vietnam War is now considered one of the bloodiest and most momentous conflicts of the 20th century. It was the result of decades of political, social and military developments rooted deep in the country’s history and in the global power struggles of the Cold War. In the fifties, during the time of the escalating East-West conflict,Vietnam as a symbol of the dispute between democracy and communism, between Western influence and Asian independence. The political decisions and strategies that were made at the time laid the foundation for the country’s later conflicts and the tragic development of the country. The following article classifies the events of that time in the larger context,Analyze the main political actors, their respective goals and the serious mistakes that ultimately led to the escalation of the Vietnam War. The focus is on the political, social and military undesirable developments of the South Vietnamese regime and the international reactions to the changing situation.

Vietnam as a strategic key in the Cold War

In 1956, American Senator John F. Kennedy formulated one of the most concise statements of his time, reflecting the strategic thinking of the United States in the Cold War. He described Vietnam as the “corner of the free world in Southeast Asia” and spoke of him as the “keystone in the arch”, the “stuffing in the dike”. With these words, Kennedy not only pressed onepersonal conviction, but also a deep-rooted political conviction of the Washington power lites, which had emerged in the years before the peak of the Cold War. This view was the result of a decades-long consideration that aimed to defend and expand the Democratic West against the Communist East. The basic conviction wasthat the United States would have to assume moral and security responsibility for the defense of democracy in Southeast Asia. The concept was clear: Vietnam was the bulwark that was supposed to stop the spread of communism in the region. This attitude was backed up by a series of security policy principles, which in the 1950s became the guidelineof American foreign policy.

The security policy pillars of the American foreign strategy

The American politics of those years was largely shaped by the Truman doctrine, which was promulgated in 1947. She explained that the US is willing to support any state that needs to be defended against communist influences to prevent communism from spreading. In addition, the NSC-68 paper was developed, which was a massive upgrade of the AmericanArmed Forces and strengthened the US global presence. Eventually, the so-called Domino theory was developed, which said that a country’s case into communism would trigger a chain reaction in which neighboring countries would follow. From this point of view, democracy and freedom were declared the central goals of American foreign policy. it becameArgued that these values are irrevocable even if occasional misjudgments and errors made implementation difficult. It was important to the rulers that the motives and intentions always stayed on the right track. On the other hand, the assessment was that communism was an aggressive, expansionist force that would never be satisfied, but would always strive forto gain more territory and influence. History and experience, they believe, have shown that an aggressive state can never be permanently appeased. The famous Munich Agreement of 1938, which allowed the Western powers to agree to the forced dissolution of Czechoslovakia by Hitler, was used as a warning example. It showed that forgiving politicsonly lead to further expansion compared to an aggressor. The American assessment was that the so-called containment policy that Truman pursued was essentially correct.

The importance of the defense of the Free States

At its core, American foreign policy was focused on the idea that the security of the West is only as strong as the weakest link in the free states’ chain. This meant that communism’s victory in one country threatened the entire security architecture. It was therefore essential to control and prevent the communist movements and governmentsthat they expanded. The case of Vietnam became a symbol: A communist victory in South Vietnam would endanger the security of the US and the entire western block. But the reality of the fifties began to question this rigid view. While the Soviet Union was still a nuclear power that has its power through upgrading and influence in Eastern Europe andother regions showed, the Soviet society changed itself. After Stalin’s death, the politics of mass persecution was discontinued. The new Soviet leadership searched for ways of “peaceful coexistence” with the West, which meant a significant change in the world view. During this time, important movements also emerged in the so-called Third World. Everywhere in AfricaAnd Asia grew the desire for independence, self-determination and national sovereignty. While France was caught in Algeria after 1954 in a lossy war, Britain began to transfer its colonial empire to the so-called “Commonwealth of Nations”, a kind of voluntary alliance of independent states. In 1957 Malaya became independent, and proclaimed in the same yearKwame Nkrumah with British support the Republic of Ghana. British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan warned in 1960 of the signs of change blowing through Africa and spoke of the “Wind of Change”. Many young states did not want to be pushed into the east-west scheme of the superpowers. Instead, they were based on the policy of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru,who pursued a consistent neutrality policy. Nehru believed that an independent, peaceful foreign policy was needed to advance the development of one’s own society. His policy, known as “dynamic neutralism”, included the rejection of military alliances, the use of economic aid from both camps, and moral supportNational Liberation Movements. His approach was embodied in the “blockless movement” which was constituted in Bandung in 1955. The aim was to create a platform for states that did not want to belong to the East or the West Bloc in order to take action against colonialism, racial discrimination and the danger of nuclear weapons. This movement became a symbol for a,Independent attitude worldwide, which was directed against the previous bipolar world order.

American undesirable developments and missed opportunities

Despite these global changes in the international order, American foreign policy failed to respond flexibly and constructively to the new challenges in the second half of the 1950s. The elites around Eisenhower, Dulles and the foreign policy establishment held on to old thought patterns, which were mainly in the fight against the threat of theNational Socialism and Stalinism. These thought patterns were sluggish and blocked an appropriate response to the more complex international conditions. The conservative attitude was also evident in the USA. The government under Eisenhower only hesitantly implemented the demands of the African Americans for equality. Martin Luther King andOther activists called for full integration and the abolition of racial segregation, but the government responded with a policy of “small steps” that delayed social change. Many Americans felt over the decade that society remained in a kind of paralysis that both political stability and social momentumDisabled. An example of the outdated approaches is the support of the South Vietnamese dictator NGO Dinh Diem. As early as October 1954, President Eisenhower made the support of Diem dependent on a long-term stabilization of his government. The aim was to create a stable government and national awareness in South Vietnam. At first Diem seemed thisto meet expectations. Resistance to communist movements organized by sects, criminals, military and administration parts seemed broken. Diem seemed to ride on the back of the so-called “Vietnamese Tiger” and sit firmly in the saddle. But the reality was different. The broad majority of the population hardly identified with the new onegovernment. The state was just an elite question, and most people did not see their actual interests represented by the government. The support was only superficial, and the dissatisfaction spread. This strengthened the political and social upheavals within South Vietnam instead of resolved.

economic development and dependence on the West

The importance of a stable economic base was recognized early in Washington. In 1949, Truman had already announced economic aid for the peripheral regions as part of its “Point Four” program. The aim was to advance development in the poorer countries in order to curb the influence of communism. In the 1950s, a wave of support beganof the states received technical, financial and personal assistance. Scientists and economists at American universities developed concepts and programs that popularized terms like “Development Aid” and “Third World”. The most important representative of this development was Walt Rostov, who in 1959 his bookThe Stages of Economic Growthpublished. His modernization theory postulated that the social, economic and cultural changes that Europe and the USA had undergone in the course of the industrial revolution would also occur in the so-called Third World countries. Especially in Southeast Asia, Rostov anticipated a take-off phase in which the companies supportedto modernize. Within the framework of this strategy, the South Vietnamese government received a total of $1.447 billion in economic aid between 1955 and 1961. In addition, there were 508 million dollars in military aid. This made South Vietnam the country that received the highest per capita aid after South Korea and Laos. The funds were mainly for the armed forces budget,the state budget and the infrastructure. A significant part of the American financial aid was handled by the so-called “Commercial Import Program”. Washington made dollars available to the government in Saigon, which were passed on in local currency. This system allowed traders to purchase foreign products in local currency and thusto boost trade. But this rule also had dark sides. It promoted corruption within the country: government officials and licensees mined enormous profits through the systematic use of the funds. In the mid-sixties, the so-called “windfall profits” amounted to 200 to 600 million dollars annually, which weakened the economy in its independenceand increased dependence on the West. The urban population benefited from the system, but the economy as a whole remained weak.

Military construction and the fatal misjudgment

In addition to economic support, the military structure was also of central importance. The American government sent advisors to reorganize, equip and train the armed forces of South Vietnam. The so-called “Military Assistance and Advisory Group” (Maag) was initially founded with 360 men and later increased to almost 700 soldiers. she wasResponsible for the distribution of military aid and the formation of the armed forces, the so-called “Armée of the Republic of Vietnam” (ARVN). The organization was based on the experiences of the Korean War and assumed a conventional defense against an invasion from the north. That is, the strategy was on a war against regular North Vietnamese troopsaligned, which should exceed the 17th degree of latitude. But as early as 1958 it became apparent that this strategy did not do justice to the actual circumstances. The civil war in the south erupted and the ARVN proved to be largely incapable of effectively preventing the armed resistance against the communist guerrilla movements. Another problem was that theCultural differences between American advisers and Vietnamese soldiers made it difficult to build a functioning army. Most American officers did not master Vietnamese, let alone French, which made communication considerably more difficult. Prejudices and racism have always come to light openly. Many US officers commented disparagingly about theVietnamese soldiers, they described as “Gooks” and believed they were not capable of learning. At the same time, the Vietnamese were quickly confronted with the accusation of colonialism when the American advisors did not appear to them as partners, but rather as guardians. However, the biggest problem was President Diem himself. He prevented real coordinationand cooperation between the troops. His policy was characterized by centralized control. He determined all personnel decisions and did not allow any independent decisions of the military leadership. So high-ranking officers, like Lieutenant General Duong van Minh, were transferred to posts where they did not have their own troops. This did not result in a real onecommunity in the force. Morality was low, many soldiers saw the army as a means of maintaining the power of the president rather than a national force.

Diem and the political structure of South Vietnam

Diem itself was the central problem of the South Vietnamese state. His style of government was autocratic and heavily influenced by Confucian-Catholic traditions. The facade of a democracy, introduced after the 1955 elections, was only superficial. In reality, Diem had an autocratic rule, in which he led the country according to old, authoritarian principles.a parliament and alleged human rights, but these principles have been trampled on in reality.

The appearance of democratic legitimacy was maintained through manipulation in elections. The 1955 elections were marked by massive electoral fraud. The opposition was systematically eliminated, critical journalists, students and intellectuals were arrested orintimidated. The election result was secretly controlled by the army and loyal circles.

Diem saw himself as the supreme ruler watching over the land. His philosophy of government was based on Confucian Catholic principles, which saw the ruler as infallible and superior to man. In this worldview, the sovereign was a mediator between heavenand earth, and the people owed him obedience. Human rights were seen only as a façade, while actual political practice was based on control and oppression.

The government had close ties to the family. Relatives and confidants of the president dominated the most important positions. His brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, who acted in the background, was the real power bearer.The Diem family ran a government-owned network of nepotism, corruption and political intrigue. The administration was riddled with nepotism, and corruption was pervasive. The power of the family was secured by the establishment of two secret services that spied on each other.

The political leadership was characterized by a deep rejection ofthe measures against the communist movement were brutal: thousands of people were arrested, put into camps or murdered. The land reform had only limited success because most farmers had hardly the means to acquire or cultivate land. The abolition of local self-government bodies meant that the traditional power structures on the groundlandowners who formerly acted as local rulers were replaced by a central administration that showed little understanding of the local realities.

The Rise of the “Agrovilles” and the Social Crisis

In order to increase control over the rural population, the government began the project of “Agrovilles” – forced relocations to fortified villages in July 1959. The aim was to better monitor the rural population and to be able to identify communist sympathisers at an early stage. However, the implementation was catastrophic. Many farmers were forced to demolish their old huts in order toto enable the construction of the new settlements. The material was often smeared by corrupt officials who secured the proceeds.

The material loss was enormous for most farmers. For many, the separation from the family graves, which play a central role in the Confucian Buddhist tradition, was difficult to cope with. Leaving the ancestors behind meant for theFarmers a heavy mental burden. Most refused to move and returned to their original villages after a few weeks – a sign of the project’s failure. For the regime, the result was clear: the “Agrovilles” became a symbol of state arbitrariness and social disagreements.

Opposition and the Crisis of Democracy

Resistance formed as early as April 1960. Former senior officials of the French colonial administration who met at the “Hotel Caravelle” in Saigon published a manifesto calling on the government to liberalize and reform the country. They criticized the violent measures against the opposition, the electoral falsifications and the increasing repression.clear that there was great dissatisfaction in society. Diem reacted with a hard hand: opposition journalists, students and intellectuals were arrested, and they were subjected to “communist connections”. In November 1960, some paratroopers attempted to storm the presidential palace, but the coup was quickly crushed. Nevertheless, it was shown that in thesociety was growing unrest. Political stability was increasingly threatened and the regime’s crisis was on the rise. The way Vietnam through the 1950s was characterized by a mixture of ideological fixation, outdated strategies and political wrong decisions. The undeveloped of the South Vietnamese regime, dependence on the West, theNeglect of social reality and increasing social divisions helped the country plunged into a bloody conflict in the following years, which still has an impact today. The events of that time are a memorial to the consequences of a rigid ideology that ignores the complex social and political realities.