America’s Way to the Vietnam Conflict: Strategies, Covenants and Secret Operations after the Geneva Conference

After the end of the Geneva Indochina Conference in 1954, a phase of intensive political, military and secret service activities in Southeast Asia began for the United States. The aim was to secure the US influence in the region in the long term, to contain the communist influence and to build a pro-American state in South Vietnam. The USA resorted to oneMultiple strategies that ranged from diplomatic alliances to hidden operations. This article analyzes the main measures, political objectives and the background that shaped American intervention in Vietnam and shows how these developments significantly influenced the way to later Vietnam War.

The Geneva Conference and the US First Response: Disappointment and Strategic Reorientation

The American government had only hesitantly and with considerable reservations at the Indochina Conference in Geneva in 1954. She had even been willing to refuse official approval of the armistice and the decision to divide the conference. The US ultimately saw Geneva’s results as a major setback and were excessivedisappointed. The National Security Council in Washington even spoke of a “catastrophe” that endangered American interests in the region. Despite this critical assessment, however, it was recognized that the temporary division of Vietnam offered a strategic opportunity: It could be used to isolate the South from the influence of communist forces and the AmericanExpanding the zone of influence in Southeast Asia. In this context, the focus of American foreign policy shifted to two central objectives. First, the anti-communist movement in southern Vietnam should be strengthened to create a nationalist and pro-American alternative to Ho Chi Minh. Associated with this was the need to influence the French influence in South Vietnamquickly push back to secure the country’s independence under American control. Second, the construction of a regional security architecture was planned to prevent the spread of communist spheres of influence. These two goals were closely linked and formed the basis for the US long-term strategy in the region.

The founding of the Seato: A regional alliance against communism

In September 1954, a few months after the Geneva Conference, the United States, together with the UK, Australia, New Zealand, France, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan, decided to establish the so-called “Southeast Asian Contracting Community” (Seato). The aim of this alliance was to set up a common defense and security strategy against the growing communist danger into establish Southeast Asia. Members undertook to consult and support each other in the event of an external threat, especially by communist states. In addition, a separate protocol stipulated that the scope of the treaty would be extended to Laos, Cambodia and the so-called “free territory under the jurisdiction of Vietnam”.Unlike NATO, which provided a binding collective protection guarantee for the members, Seato was a rather loose alliance with an advisory function. The member states only committed to mutual consultations without entering into a binding defense obligation. In addition, the Treaty contained a clear violation of the Geneva Conference resolutions, as heareas that had been explicitly excluded from the decisions, namely the entire Indochina region. This approach showed how much the US used the region as a playing field for its geopolitical interests and how the existing agreements were deliberately circumvented. The American leadership, represented by President Eisenhower and Foreign Minister Dulles, was aware that Seato inFirst and foremost, was an instrument to justify future interventions in Southeast Asia and to consolidate American dominance in the region.

Secret Service Activities: The hidden power in the background

In addition to the diplomatic measures and the establishment of military alliances, the secret services played a decisive role in the implementation of American interests in Vietnam. The CIA, led by Allen W. Dulles, became a central instrument of covert influence. President Eisenhower, Foreign Minister Dulles and his brother, the CIA director, saw inIntelligence operations are an indispensable means to gain influence in countries where open interventions were politically, legally or internationally difficult. The CIA control was largely out of the Congress’s sphere of influence, which significantly expanded the organization’s scope for action. The CIA led a variety ofoperations to manipulate the political situation in South Vietnam. In June 1954, twelve agents were sent to Saigon to weaken the last French influences and to stabilize the power relations in the country. One of her main players was Edward Lansdale, who was considered an active advocate of the “Can-Do” spirit. Lansdale was instrumental in the suppressionCommunist uprisings in the Philippines and firmly believed that American financial aid, pragmatism and personal commitment could direct the development of the Third World toward capitalism and democracy. Lansdale relied on a range of intelligence methods: He sent teams to northern Vietnam to destabilize the population,Spreading false prophecies by bribed astrologers, conducted psychological warfare and fueled resentment through leaflet actions. The aim was to weaken the influence of the communists through intimidation and disinformation. The propaganda claimed that the sky over the north had turned away from the “godlessness” of the communist regime and moved to the southbe This was intended to motivate the Catholic population in the south to leave the north. The CIA invested significant resources in psychological operations to influence the population and minimize communist influence. Although these measures did not alone evade the flight of about a million Catholics from the north to the south, theydestabilization and facilitated the further influence of the USA.

Support for the South Vietnamese government: Diem on the way to power

During the Geneva Conference, the American Foreign Ministry began to search for suitable personalities who could form a stable and pro-American government in South Vietnam. The main demand was that this government should be both anti-communist, anti-colonial and nationalistic. However, the political elite Vietnam was due to theirCollaboration with the French hardly trustworthy and was considered fragile. In this complex political environment, one came across NGO Dinh Diem, a convinced Catholic who was already familiar with French administrative corruption and political intrigues as early as the 1930s. Diem was a controversial figure: in 1933 he was temporarily interior minister under Bao Dai, but became aConflict with the French was deposed again just a few weeks later. After that he withdrew into private life. After World War II, Ho Chi Minh tried to get him to work together, but Diem was determined against the Communists – a decision that was reinforced by the assassination of one of his brothers by the Viet Minh. He moved to the US,where he settled in New Jersey and gained influence through lectures and contacts in Washington. Support included well-known personalities such as Cardinal Francis Spellman, William O. Douglas, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Kennedy, John F. Kennedy’s father, and the young senator Kennedy himself, who was later to become president, and General William “Wild Bill”Donovan, the former head of the Oss. This protection gave Diem a decisive advantage: In 1955, he was recognized by the US and the French allies as the appropriate leader for anti-communist South Vietnam. On June 25, 1954, Diem landed in Saigon to consolidate his power. Despite its lack of popularity and the skeptical attitude ofFrench colonial administration managed to strengthen control step by step. The French power centers, such as the army and various sects that controlled large parts of the Mekong Delta, and the mafia organization Binh Xuyen in Saigon, were initially opposition to his rule. There were violent conflicts in the spring of 1955, in which Diem tried toweaken groups.

The power struggle in Saigon: Diem against the forces of chaos

The American special ambassador in Saigon, General J. Lawton Collins, observed the development with growing distrust. He criticized the corruption and political instability of the Diem government and felt that these problems were significantly weakening Vietnam’s defense power. In late April 1955, Collins traveled to Washington to get the US government on the incompetenceto point out to diems. President Eisenhower was convinced that only stronger support and restructuring of the power relations could ensure Diems’ continued existence. Against the resistance of Foreign Minister Dulles, it was decided to give Diem a representative role for the time being, while the actual power was in the army. Collins was commissioned to look for an alternativedie diem to look for. But at a crucial moment, the prime minister’s strength was evident: His loyal troops were able to fend off Binh Xuyen’s attack on the Presidential Palace, and Diem took the opportunity to weaken the sects and criminal organizations in Saigon with the support of the CIA and Lansdale operations. The CIA paid large-scale bribesScrew leaders to pull them to Diems side and conducted military operations against rival groups. Within a few weeks, Diem was the undisputed power in South Vietnam. Washington was enthusiastic about his assertiveness and his will to take control.

Power consolidation and manipulative choice

Just a few months later, in January 1955, Diem made a final test of power: He was elected President of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in an election he controlled. The choice was clearly manipulated: The official figures gave him 98.5 percent of the votes, although the actual consent was probably significantly lower. The choice was mainly used toto cement power relations and finally end the French colonial rule. The campaign tactics were characterized by deception: The ballot papers for Diem were red, which symbolized happiness, while those candidates were green for Bao Dai’s, which signaled misfortune. The turnout was also fake: In Saigon, officially 405,000 votes were counted, in fact they should605,000 votes for which have been cast. Despite the obvious manipulations, this choice was enough to consolidate the approval of Diem in Washington. The American government appreciated its anti-communist attitude and ability to govern authoritarian. This laid the foundation stone to consolidate the division of Vietnam and further steps towards aprevent the overall Vietnamese solution.

The rejection of the all Vietnamese elections and the continuation of the division

The American government and the government in Saigon publicly declared that while they were striving for free elections throughout Vietnam, the rejection was in fact great. It was feared that in an all-Vietnamese election, the communists under Ho Chi Minh could gain the upper hand. Finally, the communists and the Viet Minh in the south had broad support,especially in the peasant masses. The fear that an election would lead to a communist dictatorship was omnipresent. Behind the scenes, it was advocated to maintain the division because it was believed that the decisions of the Geneva Conference were only a temporary solution. In this climate, the so-called “Nation Building” began in South Vietnam – the attempt toto build a stable state that was armed against communism. This process was to lay the foundation for the later Vietnam War, in which the US intervened on both sides with military support and political influence. The division of Vietnam was thus formally accepted, but firmly anchored in reality.