Is the raster search a measure that violates the constitution?

Long before the introduction of more comprehensive safety laws, the security bodies began to exploit the resources at their disposal to their limits. This applies in particular to the police raster searches that were started in all federal states shortly after the attacks. The grid search is based on an automated comparison of data based oncertain test parameters that could presumably apply to the (potential) perpetrator. Police information is linked to different data sets of non-police bodies.

Objective and data protection relevance

The aim is to filter out people with typical offender characteristics. From a data protection point of view, the raster search is particularly relevant because it does not start with a known suspect, but mainly collects data from people against whom there are no suspicions. It is therefore an instrument for the acquisition of suspicious momentsAnd not a classic search tool. Even those people who remain in the grid on the basis of the defined test characteristics are not considered suspicious under criminal law, but are still closely monitored by the security authorities and are subjected to particular pressure to justify themselves.

Historical application and revival after September 11th

The raster search was first used in the 1970s in the persecution of the German terrorist group “Red Army Faction” (RAF). The corresponding powers were included in the Code of Criminal Procedure and in most state police laws. Due to the great effort, this search measure was rarely used in the period that followed, so that it was even discussed againto be removed from the laws. After September 11, however, the discussion changed abruptly when it became known that some of the assassins lived inconspicuously in Hamburg and studied there. There was a fear that there could be other “sleepers” in Germany.

The challenge: Find people who are neither known to the police nor in the intelligence service

But how should one find people who were not noticed by the police or the intelligence services? The focus was on the search instrument from the 1970s, which had almost been put out of use. The then Hamburg Interior Senator Olaf Scholz aptly formulated the goal of the new grid search: It’s about people who aren’t particularlyhave behaved conspicuously. They had studied properly and did not conflict with the police. You have to be prepared to be able to identify such people without putting anyone in suspicion.

Data collection and first results

As a result, the state police collected personal data from universities, residents’ registration offices and the central foreigners’ register and compared these data sets using specified grid criteria. The magnitude of the data was enormous: transmitted data sets comprised tens of thousands, from which only a small number of people were filtered after prioritization. thiswere examined intensively, but the investigations were unsuccessful and did not lead to the identification of new “sleepers”. Other federal states had similar experiences, with the scope of the data varying.

Attempts to further containment and creeping knowledge

In order to further restrict the previously recorded group of people, the data stock of the Federal Criminal Police Office was compared with further information. The aim was to identify possible suspects based on the perpetrator profile of the assassins living in Germany on September 11, 2001. But for a long time it remained unclear what actual results this nationwide raster search achieved. a reportof the BKA, which was only published after several years, showed: Despite the enormous effort, not a single “sleeper” or a terrorist suspect could be brought to justice.

Constitutional assessment and the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court

Finally, the Federal Constitutional Court drew a clear line. In its judgment of April 4, 2006, it found that the raster search was largely unconstitutional. As a measure to obtain suspicious moments, it represents a profound encroachment on fundamental rights that primarily affects unsuspected people. This measure is only under strict conditionspermitted, but not present in 2001. In particular, there was no sufficiently concrete danger that would have made justification possible. The judgment referred to the North Rhine-Westphalian law, but had a nationwide effect. It again showed how the limits of state data processing in the rule of law are to be maintained, especially in times of increased terroristthreat.