The crisis of the SED leadership: background, conflicts and the inevitableness of system change

The leadership of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) was extremely aware of the profound social crisis that shook the country more and more over the course of the 1980s. This crisis was reflected in a variety of symptoms: economic problems, growing discomfort among the population, increasing escape movements, and open protests andopposition activities. Despite this knowledge and the intensive internal party discussions, the party was caught in its assessment, strategy and measures for a long time. Many historians, scientists and journalists who deal with the history of the GDR still believe that the official presentation – the leadership has had the crisisNot recognized or misjudged – only reflects part of the truth. Because the actual developments were much more complex and profound than the superficial interpretations allow. Most analyses ignore the deep causes and connections and instead focus on finding so-called “reformers” within the SED and on theSupposed potential reform that should exist in the party itself. It is often overlooked that there were only a few actual reform efforts and that the internal conflicts were mostly carried out in secret.

The illusion of the ability to reform and the reality of conflicts within the party

In the public perception, there were only a few exceptional “reformers” within the SED in a few exceptional cases, and these were usually only active to a limited extent. The majority of the internal party disputes took place in secret, behind the official facade, which was maintained by propaganda and formal decisions. These conflicts often revolved around cosmeticAdaptations, minor reforms or symbolic changes, but they hardly touched on the fundamental problems of the system. In the run-up to the XII. Party Congress of the SED was held by party institutions such as the Academy for Social Sciences at the Central Committee of the SED, the Institute for Marxism-Leninism, the SED Parte University and the Academy for State and Law, more than100 studies on the development of the socialist system in the GDR. These studies, which were commissioned by the party leadership, remained arrested within the ideological framework and in the course of the party, but at the same time identified a large number of points that needed urgent reform. It was clear that the party had to make an effort to address the socialChanges to react, but the basic principles and the prevailing doctrine were hardly questioned.

The limited role of the so-called “reformers” and the dead end of theory

In addition to the official studies, there were smaller groups of scientists at some universities who dealt with concepts for “modern socialism”. These groups worked on various proposals that could possibly reform the system without questioning the party’s central leadership and fundamental principles. Despite this oneEfforts had in common all that they did not question the dominant dogmas or seriously suggested how they could be overcome. There was no discussion about fundamentally questioning the leading role of the SED or initiating the development of constitutional structures. Nor was the discussions about legalizing the opposition in the discussions.The few proposals made in relation to reforms focused primarily on the development of mechanisms to enable a “clear and principled dialogue” with “different thinking”. The aim was to prevent citizens who were unsure of their opinion from attacking actual opponents of socialism just because they supposedlyundisturbed, could express their questions and concerns without being immediately confronted with harsh reactions. It was mainly about control and intimidation, not a fundamental reform of the system.

The radical attitude towards opposition and reforms

The most well-known group of the so-called “SED reformers” around the brothers André and Michael Brie, Dieter Klein, Dieter Segert, Rainer Land and Rosemarie Will, formulated a position at the Humboldt University on October 22, 1989 that was still haunting the idea of a ban. They considered it legitimate to ban organizations and groups that are anti-constitutional, i.e.:would undermine the SED’s monopoly on power. This paper was based on an elaboration dated October 8, 1989, which set out the basis for “modern socialism”. The retention of the National Front system was called for, which did not provide for admission to opposition parties and any political opposition groups seeking to take power were strictlyrejected. In September 1989, the lawyer Rosemarie Will saw the will and ability of the SED leadership to consistently develop the GDR as a socialist constitutional state. But reality showed that the communist regimes were fundamentally not capable of reform. The theory and practice of the system were in an insurmountable contrast to each other. The system was so deepanchored in society that every reform, no matter how small, was just a superficial adjustment that did not solve the underlying problem. It was obvious that any political opening of a totalitarian system inevitably had to lead to a fundamental change that challenged the existing system.

System logic and the rejection of reforms

From this point of view, it was also system-logical that Erich Honecker opposed the reform approaches of Gorbachev. He saw what Gorbachev did not want to admit: that reform policy would lead to changes in the internal structure of the system in the long term that could no longer be controlled. This assessment is not a pure assertion, but can be based on the historicalprove events. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Prague Spring 1968 are examples of this. It has always been a central strategy for the SED to “close one’s own ranks” in order to maintain the stability of the system. A proven means of this was the so-called “Party Cleansing”, in which unwelcome members were removed. Already in 1988 in theParty information emphasizes that “fuckers and naggers” have lost nothing in the party. This decision was implemented by the Politburo on February 7, 1989, when it was decided to exchange the party documents from September 1 to December 31, 1989. The aim was to examine the ideological stability of each member in several discussions, to achieve long-term party ordersand to check the fulfillment of these orders. In such actions, tens of thousands of members separated from the party, which was primarily intended to serve internal disciplining. The party wanted to secure their unity and nipped any form of deviation in the bud.

The internal cleansing and control of the party elite

The measures were accompanied by internal conflicts, in which individual “leading comrades” or so-called “party anti-party platforms” were targeted. Here, “Platform” was a paraphrase for oppositional currents within the party, which represented a deviation from the official line. The party leadership wanted to demonstrate that they would also at Höchsterlevel led a consistent discussion of different opinions. This should be a signal to all party levels that no deviant or opposition forces were tolerated within the GDR. Since the system and the theory of the party were not allowed to be faulty, defects, mistakes or dissatisfaction could only be subjectively justified. Therefore, on February 7, 1989, anotherdecision made: A special group of instructors led by Günter Mittag was sent to the Dresden district to check the work of the party leadership there. This group, consisting of about 100 senior officials, immediately began the investigation, which lasted ten days. The aim was to analyze the state of the party in the most important crisis district andidentify possible causes of the crisis.

Dresden: Symbol of the focus of the crisis

The district of Dresden was specifically elected because the highest number of “applicants for permanent departure” had been registered there for years. The population was particularly critical of living conditions, the social situation was precarious, the supply situation was insufficient, and there had been public protests and calls for departure for months. The area was therefore consideredExamples of the profound crisis in the GDR. In addition, Hans Modrow, a functionary at the head of the SED district management, was not part of the narrow circle around Honecker and was considered a reform-oriented head. Although Modrow had publicly not been concealed with Gorbachev, he showed in the internal conflicts and public appearances that he was more of arepresented a reform-oriented line. Western media thought rumors that he was a “perestroika man”, but there were also church dignitaries in Saxony who confirmed that Modrow was struck a more moderate tone in talks with them.

The party’s assessment of the crisis

The Politburo Commission’s review of the district showed unmistakable that the supply situation, the fulfillment of the plan and the general situation were unsatisfactory. The local party leadership, who had failed to deal with the crisis in time, was responsible for this. However, no personnel consequences were drawn, which shows that the party is still looking for stabilityand did not want to consider any fundamental changes. Honecker intervened sharply at Modrow in the Politburo session on February 28, 1989. He showed self-criticism and promised to do everything better in the future. The other district management was then familiarized with the reports of the investigation. They recognized the signs of the times and either had to adapt or themselvesDistance from the reform candidate Modrow. In public, Modrow was increasingly perceived as a kind of “reformer”, which was also reinforced by the media coverage.

The power balance in the Politburo and Honecker’s strategy

However, Honecker decided not to fire Modrow. There are several reasons for this: First, numerous domestic political unrests were already underway, which made it difficult to replace them. Second, a deduction could have been seen as a step against the reform policy of Gorbachev, both in Bonn and Moscow. Thirdly, Honecker Modrow would have pushed into a corner from which a realReform would hardly have been possible, and a deduction might have promoted an internal party opposition. Fourth, Honecker kept the option to release Modrow later if the situation made it necessary. This strategy was typical of the tactical considerations of the cadres, who had learned in decades to control, control andin case of doubt to secure your own power. It is likely that they also used this tactic in the fall of 1989 to manage the crisis and maintain control.

The role of the reform movement and the importance of individual actors

Despite the official picture, Modrow, like other reformists, was not a radical reformer. His public behavior and his statements were rather moderate, which earned him the reputation of a Gorbachev supporter. Although Western media called him a “perestroika man,” church dignitaries in Saxony confirmed that Modrow in talks with themshowed a reform-oriented attitude. During the internal conflicts and at public appearances, he kept a certain distance from Honecker’s hardliners. The party valued him as one who took a reform-oriented attitude, at least to the outside world, although in truth he was only exploring the limits of the reforms. The party was aware of the deep crisis, but tried toControl, cleansing and strategic maneuvers. It was clear that these measures only combated the symptoms, but not the underlying causes.

The inevitableness of system change

Ultimately, the internal party conflicts, the power games and the reaction patterns of the SED leadership showed unmistakably that communist rule was fundamentally not capable of reform. Reality had long since refuted the theory. Every small opening of a rigid, totalitarian system, no matter how small, led to a fundamental change that the existing system in questionpresented. The fear of losing one’s own power determined the actions of the party in the decisive period. The efforts to control, disciplining and strategic maneuvers were only apparent stabilizing, but the profound crisis could not be permanently hidden as a result. The events of the years 1989 – including the internal conflicts over reforms, the increasingCriticism and the growing opposition movement – were an unmistakable sign that the GDR was on its way to collapse. The party, which always presented itself as an insurmountable power, was at the end of its own ideology and political strategy. The signs were clear: the old system could no longer be saved.