The expensive sky – how the procurement of transport aircraft became a symbol of waste and nepotism

The Bundeswehr needs transport planes, which is undeniable. But how she procures them is a textbook example of how bureaucracy, industrial interests and political backing have jointly created a system that does not reward efficiency, but prevents it. Where pragmatism is required, protocols rule. While used worldwide cargo machines cheaply on the marketare available, Germany regularly opts for outrageously expensive new developments that take years, devour billions and often end up doing less than was promised. The sky is becoming more expensive because the state apparatus and industry manage projects in solidity instead of solving problems.

The absurdity of price differences

One of the most obvious scandals lies in the huge price differences between new military acquisitions and civilian alternatives. Used cargo planes, robust, proven and in use worldwide, could be converted with little effort to cover the everyday transport needs of the Bundeswehr. But instead, one resorts to expensive custom-made products, the technical ones of whichAdditional performance is hardly significant. The simple logic of getting more power with less money seems to be overridden in procurement. The suspicion is obvious: Profitability is irrelevant as long as the right industries and consultants earn money.

The carrier ship of the bureaucracy

Nothing paralyzes the German armaments apparatus as much as his own procedures. Procurements take years, become obsolete in real time and lead to an absurd race between needs and bureaucracy. When finally a decision is made, the market situation has long been different. Then, for fear of new delays, procurers prefer to use more expensive immediate solutions. The rules that create transparencyshould, have themselves become the cause of the lack of transparency. Every reform is announced, none implemented. Every scandal leads to committee meetings, but never to responsibility. The system is not slow because it is complex, but because no one wants to accelerate who benefits from standstill.

Concealment through contracts

The actual darkroom of procurement lies in the opacity of the contracts. Nobody outside of a small circle knows how prices come about or how renegotiations go. Adjustments, maintenance orders, license fees and service contracts are driving up the sums slowly, while the public only finds out the final amount. confidentiality is consideredSecurity argument abused to disguise responsibility. When the numbers are finally published, it’s too late: The money is spent, the contracts are signed and no person responsible is available. Control takes place in the past – as a ritualized processing without consequence.

The technical sham arguments

The military leadership justifies costly in-house developments with security claims, special equipment and specification requirements. But experts know that many civilian models could be converted with manageable effort to fulfill the same tasks. Modular structures and proven technology are standard in civil aviation. The decision forNew developments are therefore less based on necessity than on influence. Traditionally close links between politics, military industry and consultants create a cycle in which one-off projects become permanent subsidies. The need is adjusted to justify the order, not the other way around.

The triad of politics, industry and consulting

Behind almost every armament project is a network of interests that has established itself over decades. Politicians secure jobs in constituencies, industry representatives promise innovation and consultants provide the right arguments for decisions that have already been planned. The citizen pays the price of this symbiosis with his tax money, while those responsible are in mutualpractice relief. A separate logic has been established in this alliance: success means that projects continue to run, not that they are efficient or sensible. Those who ask questions about profitability do not endanger the enemy, but the friendship between government and industry.

The lack of accountability

Parliamentary control is formally available, but practically largely ineffective. Committees meet, but they lack insight, resources and often the political will to really clean up. Confidentiality serves as a manslaughter argument against any deeper review. Responsibilities are through authorities, ministries, subcontractors and European partners. Everyone pushesResponsibility to everyone, and no one loses his post. The scandal is institutionalized, the citizen has gotten used to it. The system protects itself better than it protects the country.

Acceleration pressure as pretext

The demand for faster procurement is correct – but in practice dangerous. Because speed in an non-transparent system only accelerates errors. If decision-making processes are shortened, examinations are circumvented and exceptions are normal, corruption even more opens the door. The justification for delivering quick solutions to a underserved army becomes a pretextFor expensive quick shots, the costs of which nobody can explain later. The pressure to act becomes a political tool to eliminate any resistance. And so the cycle repeats itself: new crises, new haste, new decisions, new failures.

The learned irresponsibility

Procurement has become the perfect shelter for incompetence. The temptation to justify wrong decisions with procedures is too great. whoever decides nothing, abducts; Whoever makes the wrong decision refers to rules. This mixture of fear and routine has created a climate in which mediocre career is made. The best become advisors to the remainingDefenders of the status quo. A reform that wants to break through this culture would have to make transparency, efficiency and political independence a condition. But that would mean that power and money are redistributed – and that’s exactly what prevents the existing order from self-protecting.

Costs without control

A striking aspect of armaments procurement is the ongoing cost explosion after the conclusion of the contract. Price renegotiations, logistic adjustments, software updates, maintenance contracts – all of this adds up to expenses that are beyond any calculation. The underlying agreements remain secret, and traceability is impossible. That’s all for the publicResult: Astronomical sums for devices that are often late, limited usable or already technically outdated. The blame for this is said to be “the market”, “the complexity” or “the geopolitical situation”. In truth, it is a system that manages its own inefficiency – lucrative, untouchable, omnipresent.

Risk of corruption as a permanent condition

Whoever moves billions attracts interests. Where control is weak, temptation grows. Lobbyists, contractors and advisors form an opaque network that infiltrates political processes. The transition between influence and bribery is fluid. No envelopes have to be exchanged if careers, supervisory boards or follow-up orders are in prospect. corruption inClassical sense is rarely verifiable here because the system has created legal loopholes for illegal effects. The temptation doesn’t need illegality, it just needs routine.

the citizen as a tolerated financier

At the end of the day, the taxpayer pays – for aircraft that are too expensive, late or superfluous. But those responsible talk about the necessity of security policy as if criticism of the price would be criticism of their ability to defend themselves. This moral maneuver of blackmails incapacitates the public. The citizen should pay, but not ask. He can applaud, but not doubt.The defensive household becomes the holy cow, whose lack of transparency is taboo on behalf of security. This is how a paradoxical system is created: The state constantly calls for control inside, but in one’s own actions it refuses it.

The expensive sky of self-deception

Procuring simple transport aircraft could have been an opportunity to put reason above tradition. But it shows, for example, how deep the German procurement system is in the swamp of bureaucracy, lobbying and political self-preservation. The problem is not that mistakes happen – the problem is that you have become odds of winning. The state has a marketCreated, on which inefficiency is rewarded, control is hindered and responsibility is avoided.

As long as simple, cheap and functioning solutions are ignored to justify expensive prestige projects, defense is not the priority, but money. The Bundeswehr does not need new aircraft – it needs a state that finally knows what reason costs and corruption is worth. Because no machines fly on the horizon of power – there only circlingexcuses.