Vietnam in the 1950s: A barely noticed crisis in the shadow of global events

In the late 1950s, Vietnam was only marginally important in the United States’ public discussion. The media landscape, consisting of newspapers, magazines, radio and television, paid little attention to the conflict in the Far East. Especially the television news, which during this time became one of the most important sources of information for the American populationhad become, essentially limited to reading agency reports. If foreign news was broadcast at all, then they focused primarily on other crises and events that kept the world in suspense at the time. These included the Suez crisis, the 1956 Hungary uprising, the Berlin crises from 1958, the nuclear upgrading and the Sputnik shock in theAutumn 1957. GOING UNITED The launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik marked the first successful launch of an artificial celestial body in history. This event meant a temporary but significant lead of the Soviet Union in the field of science, especially in applied science. The media, the public and the government were busyIntensive with this technological race in space, which accelerated and strengthened the expansion of its own space program in the United States. While the media focus on this technological competition, developments in South Vietnam were only sporadically mentioned. In magazines likeLifeWere the repressive measures of the South Vietnamese President NGO Dinh criticized. also in the respected specialist magazineForeign Affairsthe situation in South Vietnam was discussed, if only with critical undertones. William Henderson, a well-known analyst, stressed that the country is “now practically a police state today” characterized by arbitrary arrests, strict censorship and the lack of a real opposition. Despite these critical assessments, development experts, academics, journalists andPoliticians – apart from a few exceptions – are relatively easily distracted by the regime’s shortcomings. When trying to advance the construction of a functioning state based on colonial models, it was almost inevitable that frictional losses occurred. A state established on the rubble of the colonial administration was hardly able to immediately meet the western ideas ofTo conform to democracy, especially since the majority of the population in Southeast Asia has so far hardly been familiar with democratic principles.American public even directed their attention to the South Vietnamese autocrats in the spring of 1957. On the occasion of an official visit, Diem received the rare honor of giving a speech to both chambers of the Congress.This success was celebrated in the media, and a reception in New York rounded off the tour. theSaturday evening…At the time, Diem called “the Mandarin who knocks over the Reds’ timetable”. For a few days, the image of a smiling, petite man, wrapped in a white cloth, adorned the title pages of the media, and no one doubted that this distinguished gentleman with his French accent was the capable president of a poor country threatened by communist forces. also inCongress was only marginally perceived by South Vietnam. Although a hearing on this subject was held in 1959, the discussions focused neither on the central issues of American-South Vietnamese relations nor on the linking of military and economic aid to concrete conditions. Instead, a rather trivial topic dominated: corruption inarrives in the heart of Saigon.

The political significance of Vietnam: A secondary role in the supreme government

At the highest level of government, Vietnam played only a marginal role since 1955. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Foreign Minister John Foster Dulles trusted Ngo Dinh Diem to have the situation under control, to eliminate communist forces in North Vietnam and to build a stable, functioning state. The Pentagon military were mostly confident and believedthat the South Vietnamese army, the so-called ARVN, could successfully fend off a conventional attack by North Vietnam. In the case of alarming news from Vietnam, the military reacted primarily with the demand for more financial resources and weapons. But the basic assessment of their decisions was never seriously questioned. However, within the military there wasAlso influential personalities who opposed the course of the government. General Collins, the American special ambassador in 1954/55, emphatically emphasized that political issues are far more important than military problems. As early as 1954, the American chiefs of staff had opposed the political leadership when theyCome, a communist controlled Indochina does not affect the security of the USA. Even after 1954, leading military forces, like General Matthew Ridgway, opposed a permanent US engagement in South Vietnam. They considered the political situation too unstable and Diem unsuitable for unsuitable to the country by creating a national consciousness. another group,Consisting of analysts who generally advocated American engagement, a reorientation of priorities called for. Instead of encouraging the ARVN training to become a conventional army, they advocated – supported by the CIA – for a coordinated, political-military strategy that also included anti-guerrilla tactics, so-called countinsurgency. in view ofThe ARVN’s obvious inability to effectively combat rural revolts after 1958, these strategists advocated greater consideration of guerrilla warfare. During the term of Eisenhower, neither opponents of the engagement nor critics of the strategy were able to have a decisive influence on the decisive processes. President Eisenhower, the leadingForeign Minister and most senior Pentagon representatives were based on the commander’s optimistic assessments in Saigon, Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, also known as “Hanging Sam”. Williams was firmly convinced that Diems and his brother’s skills were sufficient to save the country from chaos and communist takeover. he believedthat the transfer of American military structures to South Vietnam, the training of the army to a conventional war and the unreserved support of Diems are the only possible ways to curb the influence of the communists. Critical voices within the military were dismissed by Williams as communist propaganda. For him it was clear that the construction of apowerful, powerful South Vietnamese army was the most important goal.

The reality in Saigon and Washington: pessimism and insecurity

However, at the American embassy in Saigon and in the CIA mission, the situation was viewed in a much more differentiated way, albeit much more pessimistic than Williams put it. Diplomats and CIA employees were watching the increasing excesses of the police state, the dissatisfaction of the population and the increasing distance between the government and the people. they admonishedUrgent reforms, but communication with the Nhu and Diem brothers became increasingly difficult. The brothers mostly responded to American advice with long monologues in which they presented their personal theories. They usually left American visitors with the firm intention of never coming back. William Colby, then head of the CIA mission, grasped the situationhis memoirs together like this: “In a situation where mutual understanding between two cultures was already difficult enough, there were far too few real communication channels.” In December 1960, American Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow, in a telegram to the Foreign Ministry, formulated his assessment of the mood among the diplomats: “We could soon bechallenging task to find and build up other leaders.”

Diem, manipulation and the limited influence of the USA

Diem masterfully knew how to play the military and diplomats against each other in order to nip the demands for liberalization and democratization in the bud. General Williams was not wrong when he said that until further notice there was no political alternative to Diem in sight. The US influence over the South Vietnamese Autocrats was strong despite theEconomic support limited. 2000 2008 2019 2019 2019. 1957, a major American journalist, aptly said: “Go under or swim with NGO Dinh Diem.” The American government chose the latter. She relied on the country’s military security, while political reforms were always treated subordinately. The decision to hold Diem in power waspolitical nature, the means to do so were primarily military.

The failure of the previous strategy and the alarming knowledge

But after two years of war in South Vietnam, it became increasingly clear that the previous strategy did not bring the desired success. In May 1960, this realization also reached the National Security Council in Washington. President Eisenhower was concerned about the developments, but he never came into question a withdrawal from the “Nation Building” project. The protocoldocumented at a secret session: “The President stated that he had received a number of reports about South Vietnam. So far we have been proud of Diem and thought that he would do a good job. But now he seemed increasingly tyrannical and blind to the actual situation.” The meeting revolved around the question of whether to take action to persuade them toto communicate more with the population. Eisenhower was aware that the situation was complex and that the protests against it were increasing. Still, he, like many of his advisors, was convinced that the US was able to control and control the political, economic and social developments in Vietnam. However, this assumption was an illusion. What US policy inin 1960, was ultimately only one tactic: the support of an anti-communist government and its support by the army to prevent a communist victory. Vietnam in 1960, according to historian David L. Anderson, was a “time bomb” that could explode at any time. The political instability, social division and inabilityThe American strategist, who exercised sustainable control, made the country a dangerous powder keg that could go up in flames at any time.