World War II and the role of the mafia

The Second World War led to the criminal underworld gaining a whole new meaning and for a time played a crucial role in warfare. In the United States, the Naval Defense, the so-called Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), was increasingly causing a stir as there were a number of acts of sabotage in the port of New York. One was particularly worryingDevastating fire in February 1942, when the French passenger ship “Normandie” rose in the flames. This ship was about to be baptized as an Allied troop ship, which further increased the urgency of security measures. William B. Herlands, a New York investigator who examined the events after the war, described the situation asa serious national emergency. The third naval district’s coastal region, which also included New York and New Jersey, was protected by a blockade, while numerous ships off the Atlantic coast were sunk by enemy submarine attacks. The result of the war was uncertain – the danger hovered like a sword of Damocles over the United States, and the situation wastense.

The idea of recruiting criminal organizations as a secret service agent

Since the US had no means of its own to monitor the port undercover, the idea came up to recruit local criminal organizations and use them as agents. The ONI contacted New York District Attorney Frank Hogan, who then suggested “Joe Socks” Lanza to Joseph. Lanza was then charged with extortion, but officially as managing director of theFishing Workers Union designated. In truth, however, he was considered the gangster boss of the Fulton fish market enclave in the lower part of New York. In March 1942, shortly after the US Navy made contact with Lanza for the first time, the ONI was concerned about the security on the coast. Captain Roscoe C. McFall, the district’s defense chief, reported to the investigating judgeHerlands later that he was increasingly worried about subversive activities of enemy agents in the port. He was particularly afraid that enemy submarines could be fueled by fishing boats operated by criminal elements. Since Lanza maintained extensive connections at the fish market and at the captains of fishing boats along the Atlantic coast, he wasthat phase of operation to the ideal contact for the Navy.

Planning the sabotage operations with Lanza

Over the next nine months, Commander Charles R. Haffenden, a subordinate McFalls, met with Lanza regularly to plan various operations. It was about the collection of information about the refueling of enemy submarines, the procurement of counterfeit union cards to inject agents on fishing boats, and the organization of the ItalianFishermen in the city as part of a submarine search system. But after just a few weeks, the ONI realized that Lanza was just an average criminal with limited influence. He was unable to provide useful information outside the fishing industry and confessed to the naval contacts that people were afraid he might use his spy services to get his impending convictionavert.

Luciano, Adonis and the Navy’s mediation

In April, Lanza explained that “Luciano could provide great help” and that he could instruct “Joe Adonis or Frank Costello”, his friends. Luciano himself was in prison at the Clinton State Prison near the Canadian border at the time. The US Navy sought contact with his lawyer, Moses Polakoff. He hesitated at first, but offered to find a trusted person -Someone whose patriotism and love for the country are undoubtedly undoubtedly. The next morning, Polakoff established the connection between the Marine and Meyer Lansky, a well-known partner Luciano in the area of drug and alcohol smuggling. Lansky referred to his close relationship with Luciano since the early 1920s and assured that the Navy could trust him.At Polakoff’s suggestion, Commander Haffenden agreed to a meeting with Luciano. Luciano was transferred from Clinton prison to nearby Great Meadow Prison to allow the meeting.

Negotiations and collaboration with Luciano and Lansky

A few weeks later, Polakoff, Lansky and Luciano met in a prison visiting room to explain the situation of naval defense. Luciano showed himself ready to cooperate and suggested acting as a liaison between him and the helpers needed to obtain information. It should be someone who acted in the name of Luciano and whocould trust unreservedly. Over the next three years, Luciano met Lansky and Twenty times with Polakoff eleven times. Haffenden himself never met Luciano, but he often maintained contact with Lansky, who – at Luciano’s request – became a mediator between the Navy and the underworld. Lansky later recalled that Haffenden explained exactly what he wanted from him: heLooked for people who might be useful for the war effort, no matter what their reputation. With that he brought these people together and instructed them what they should deliver.

The collection of information for the invasion of Sicily

Despite the ONI’s interest in sabotage protection and security in the New York ports, the Navy also used the cooperation with Luciano’s circles to gather information for the upcoming Allied invasion in Sicily. Lansky and his contacts reached a number of Sicilian immigrants through Italian American agents in the ONI offices in Manhattan via Luciano.were questioned. At Luciano’s suggestion, Lansky contacted gangster Joe Adonis, who brought six Sicilians with him to provide strategic information about the island’s coastline. Lansky remembered that before the attack on Sicily, one should explore the coastal conditions and the topography of the hinterland. The meetings were used to add maps and geographical detailscollect to prepare for the operation. Haffenden took out two large maps and showed them to the informants so that they could recognize their villages and compare them with the maps. In collaboration with ONI cartographers, a variety of maps of the Sicilian coasts were created, based on thousands of reports. About Luciano and his partners were also theNames of trustworthy Sicilian locals and mafia personalities who could be used in the campaign. In mid-1942, Haffenden gave these names to a Captain Wharton at the ONI headquarters in Washington. He later reported that about 40 percent of the information proved to be correct.

Landing in Sicily and secret operations

When the Allied forces landed in Sicily in May 1943, planning was already in full swing. US Navy commander, Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt, however, recognized a mistake in the plans. Since the island was to become an important base for the US Navy in the Italian War after the liberation, it was essential to establish a close connection to the local population. butThere was no one in the naval defense headquarters who spoke Italian. Therefore, Hewitt urgently requested six Italian-speaking agents. On May 15, four of the New York Agents of Haffenden were already on board a plane on their way to North Africa. The Allied troops landed on July 9, 1943, with 160,000 men who landed on the beaches of western Sicily.The first attacks began in the early hours of the morning when the 7th US Army attacked under General Patton Gela and Licata. Max Corvo, who played an important role in the OSS, was surprised at how little information the American espionage authority had about the planning and course of the invasion. While Corvos Team was waiting in Africa, the ONI agents from New York landed with thefirst wave in Sicily. Two were dropped off in Gela, two in Licata. One of the most important plans was to make contact with people who had been expelled from the US for crimes. One of the first successes of Alfieri, an ONI agent, was contacting such figures in Sicily. He later reported that the collaboration with the criminal underworld figuresworked very well and they were cooperative. Alfieri took the opportunity to locate the Italian naval command’s headquarters and locate it in a villa outside the beach. Unhindered, he crept past the surprised officers, broke open the safe and returned with a wealth of documents that would help the disposition of the Germans andItalian Navy in the Mediterranean. These documents made a significant contribution to accelerating the Italians’ surrender. For this operation, Alfieri was awarded a medal and a declaration of honor from the President. In later reports, Herlands explained that Alfieri also used his methods in later operations on the Italian mainland. The US Navyinitially kept the cooperation with the mafia secret and refused to publish details about it many years after the end of the Italian campaign. The history of the connection between Oni, Oss and the Mafia during the Sicily campaign therefore remains largely in the dark and is based on unofficial sources.

After defeating the weak resistance of the Italian army and securing the heads of the landing heads in Gela and Licata, Patton’s 7th Army launched an offensive in the mountains of western Sicily and moved towards Palermo. Despite over 60,000 Italian soldiers and 150 kilometers of mined roads between Patton and Palermo, his troops managed the route in remarkable fourmeet Italian mafia expert Michele Pantaleone believes that the mafiosi were largely responsible for the surprisingly fast pace of the advance on Palermo.

The mysterious message to Don Calogero Vizzini

Five days after the Allied landings, an American fighter plane flew over the village of Villalba, about 70 kilometers north of Patton’s landing head on the road to Palermo. It threw off a linen sack addressed to “to Calò”. “Zu Calò” is the code name for Don Calogero Vizzini, the powerful boss of the Sicilian mafia and rulers of the mountainous region, through which the US troopsadvanced. The sack contained a yellow silk scarf with a big black “L” that stood for Lucky Luciano. Silk scarves were considered to be the marks of marks for mafiosi traveling from Sicily to America. While the story with the scarf might only be a legend, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)’s continuous collaboration with the Mafia gives reports of contactbetween Luciano and Don Calogo credibility.

Luciano’s connection to Villalba and the meeting with the mafia

In fact, Luciano was born near Villalba, only about 20 kilometers from Lercara Fridi, where his relatives still worked for Don Calogero. Two days after the flight, three American tanks rolled into Villalba after driving 45 kilometers through enemy territory. Don Calogero got on and traveled through western Sicily for the next six days toOrganize support for the advancing American troops. When Patton’s 3rd Division entered the mountainous regions, it was clearly visible how much the local population relied on the Mafia: She protected the streets from snipers, welcomed the troops enthusiastically and guided them through the confusing area.

The role of the mafia in the military conquest of Sicily

Although the cooperation with the mafia is only a footnote in history, their cooperation with the American occupiers became significant over the course of the conquest of Sicily. There is little doubt about the close relationship between the mafia and the US troops. In the summer of 1943, when the Allies focused on the relief of the garrison on the island and preparing theoffensive in southern Italy, cooperation became even more obvious. The Pentagon said in October that “the Carabinieri and the Italian Army are enough to ensure local security.” But in reality, the fascist troops had long since deserted, and Don Calogero’s mafia seemed more reliable to maintain order.

The appointment of Mafia Mayor and the influence

In July, the Allied Military Government (AMGOT) appointed Don Calogero mayor of Villalba, while Genco Russo, also a mafia boss, became mayor of Mussumeli. Under the command of Colonel Charles Poletti, a former lieutenant governor of New York, mafiosi were appointed mayors in many cities in western Sicily. Whether Poletti personallyHad a connection to the mafia or only supported the military alliance is difficult to clarify. After the war, it became known that Poletti made the fugitive New York gangster Vito Genovese his interpreter. Luciano was also later quoted as saying that Poletti was “one of our good friends”.

The infiltration of the new government by the mafia

In the weeks after the landing, the Sicilian mafiosi organized the integration into the new Allied administration. In August 1943, British commander Lord Rennell reported that British officers, in their euphoria to replace fascist mayors with mafiosi, appointed many mafia bosses or left them the choice of suitable substitutes. While the mafia has itsConnections in secret, they took the opportunity to defame their enemies as fascist sympathizers. The measures against the fascists and the carabinieri led to a sudden increase in murders, which followed clearly mafia-like patterns.

Political Change and the Threat of Communism

As the Allied forces advanced in northern Italy, concerns about the increasing influence of communism grew. Between the end of 1943 and the middle of 1944, the membership of the Communist Party of Italy doubled. In the winter of 1944, over 500,000 workers in Turin closed their factories for eight days, despite brutal repression by the Gestapo.to around 150,000 armed fighters. However, in view of the progressive strength of the left-wing movements, the US army began to reduce the drop of weapons for the resistance groups in mid-1944. Military leaders feared that too strong a communist movement could lead fascism into a second era.

The strategic use of the mafia against communism

In Sicily, mafiosi were used in the military administration to curb the power of the communists. The mafia was considered a natural ally in the fight against the left-wing movement, as any change to the island’s feudalist structures would weaken its power. Don Calogero showed his importance to the occupying power by killing the police chief of Villalba to get away fromWhen the US Army liberated Naples in October 1943, Colonel Poletti hired the notorious gangster Vito Genovese as an interpreter for the Allied military government.

Genoese black market activities and influence in Naples

Genovese, once a lieutenant Luciano, was active again in Naples. According to U.S. Field Adjutant Orange C. Dickey, he was a member of a fascist organization, lived a luxurious life, and kept a mistress. After joining the Allied government, Genovese coordinated black market operations, smuggled stolen military goods and organized the transport of illegal goods. Hemet regularly with smugglers in his apartment in Nola. In August, Genovese was arrested by a US soldier and put on trial, but his influence persisted despite his arrest. Its network and relations with the mafia made it possible to maintain operations in southern Italy.

Cooperation between the Mafia and the US military government

As Genoese’s influence waned, his black market activities continued to flourish. Together with Don Calogero Vizzini, he organized large-scale smuggling operations in which food and staples were brought to Naples. Operations were facilitated by the support of the US Army, which provided trucks and permits to pass. This collaboration was atactical move by the Allies to ensure security of supply in southern Italy while using the mafia as allies in the fight against communist ambitions.

The Mafia as a post-war political power

The Allied occupation of Italy, especially Sicily, led to the Mafia once again becoming a major political force. Michele Pantaleone describes how the occupation and the restoration of democracy gave back their old power to the mafia. Instead of being wiped out, the mafia was reintegrated into social and political life.Weapons were ready again, exerted influence and remained a significant, albeit dark, force in Italian society to this day.