Between Security and Upheaval: How Societies Search for a New Order

Societies begin to change most rapidly when familiar forms of security disappear and the future no longer appears to be a predictable continuation of the present. Economic crises, political conflicts, technical change and cultural tensions can weaken confidence in established institutions. In such periods, people often seek home, stability and firm values, while the temptation grows to explain complicated developments through simple answers. The present may feel like the beginning of a completely new age, although only later generations can determine whether a genuine historical turning point has taken place.

The renewed desire for security

Visible uncertainty creates a strong desire for protection, inner stability and a surrounding world that appears reliable again. The feeling of belonging to a homeland gains importance and can combine with a renewed form of conservatism.

This development can be seen in the growth of political movements that promise order as well as in the radicalisation of certain religious currents. People search for fixed points when economic hardship, social confusion and political powerlessness create the impression that they can no longer influence their own future.

A look towards the East can help to reveal some of these connections. Nationally minded religious Israelis, the Muslim Brotherhood, Orthodox Russians and nationalist Hindus have sought to reconnect secular life with the sacred and to turn religion into a principle of political order.

Some people fill the emptiness created by economic hardship and the loss of familiar consumer opportunities with radical nationalism. Others seek a spiritual home in renewed religious devotion that promises protection, community and a clear explanation of the world.

These reactions are different in form, but they arise from a similar experience. When established institutions no longer provide confidence, people search for belonging in faith, nation, tradition or a clearly defined community.

Home, clothing and visible belonging

The search for identity is also visible in everyday life. In Austria, traditional clothing has gained fresh attention, while in Britain nostalgia for earlier times has grown stronger. The popularity of the royal family has reinforced the desire for a familiar national world of symbols.

More generally, many people want to express an unmistakable identity through clothing, appearance and personal habits. In a society that allows almost every form of individual presentation, visible belonging to a group can become important again.

A young person who wishes to stand apart from the majority may choose conservative values as an expression of opposition. In earlier decades, long hair, leather jackets and tattoos were often seen as signs of rebellion against the respectable middle-class order.

Today, almost every form of outward and personal difference is socially possible. For that reason, a turn towards order, discipline, family, religion and inherited customs can itself appear rebellious.

Conservatism may therefore serve as a form of protest. A person who chooses restraint, tradition and clear limits may be reacting against a society in which all boundaries appear to have disappeared.

The new retreat into private life

People who experience their own powerlessness and believe that they cannot change political conditions may withdraw into a new form of private security. This retreat resembles the Biedermeier attitude known from the period before the liberal revolutions of the nineteenth century, but the reasons are different.

The earlier retreat was shaped more strongly by political conditions. Censorship, surveillance and the absence of meaningful participation restricted public life. The present retreat is mainly motivated by personal uncertainty and exhaustion.

People today have access to ways of living that were unavailable to earlier generations. They can practise a religion or reject religious belief, live within a family or alone, form a blended family or deliberately choose loyalty, sacrifice and lifelong commitment.

Many ways of living are now possible without immediate social disgrace. Individual choice has therefore become more important, but personal expectations have also become detached from shared ideas about how a life should be lived.

Freedom expands the range of possibilities, yet it can also make orientation more difficult. When almost every decision is treated as a private choice, many people lack a generally accepted framework that could help them judge what is important.

The loss of a predictable future

Behind these developments lies a growing loss of predictability. The present and the future seem to merge, while it becomes increasingly difficult to form long-term expectations.

Technical change also plays a part in this experience. People who remain connected to digital devices throughout the day may no longer experience time as a sequence of clearly separated periods.

News, images, conversations and events from distant parts of the world arrive without a visible pause. The past, the present and the expected future can appear as a single continuous stream.

Permanent connection makes information easier to obtain, but it can also create lasting inner unrest. There are few moments in which the outside world falls completely silent.

People do not necessarily lose contact with reality, but they may lose the distance needed to arrange events, judge their importance and give them meaning.

Political Islam as a counter-model

The rise of political Islam during the late twentieth century had different causes in different countries and social groups. The renewed Muslim self-understanding often presented itself as an answer to global economic and cultural change.

Globalisation was frequently identified with a way of life shaped by the United States. For people who felt excluded or defeated by this development, political Islam offered a counter-model to the cultural, economic and political dominance of the West.

Many Arab and Muslim societies experienced pressure on local economic structures, the loss of credibility of political systems and the growing presence of western ways of life through media, trade and technology.

Political Islam promised a return to an order justified by religion. It combined social criticism, national self-assertion and religious identity into a comprehensive political claim.

Like many religious ideologies, this counter-model was marked by contradictions. Western influence was condemned, American flags were burned and western political ideas were rejected, while mobile phones, the internet and the English language were used without hesitation.

The contradictions of modern rejection

Technical and economic interdependence cannot simply be rejected. Even movements that oppose the western world with great intensity often depend on western communication systems, medical procedures, transport networks and economic opportunities.

Political hostility towards the West therefore does not necessarily mean a complete rejection of western technology. Instead, it often produces a selective form of adoption. The technical benefits are accepted while the cultural and political origins of those benefits are denied.

The same tension can be found in other forms of nationalism. Many movements appeal to an imagined purity of the past while depending on international markets, modern transport and worldwide communication.

The desire for a closed community is therefore in conflict with the conditions under which that community actually exists. Separation is pursued through means that depend on global connection.

Modern movements of resistance often use the instruments of the world they claim to oppose. This does not make their opposition meaningless, but it reveals the difficulty of returning to a supposedly untouched past.

The financial crisis as an accelerator

Some developments suggest that a longer period of historical change has begun. The financial crisis caused by the collapse of the American property market intensified political and social tendencies that had already existed.

These tendencies included separatist movements, growing distrust of public institutions and a retreat into national or regional identities. The crisis showed that worldwide economic connection creates not only prosperity but also shared vulnerability.

For a long time, many observers claimed that the terrorist attacks against the United States had opened a completely new age. The attacks were undoubtedly important, but their historical importance may have been exaggerated when compared with the effects of the wars that followed.

The military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq changed international politics, created prolonged conflicts and imposed financial burdens that weakened public budgets for many years.

The financial pressure created by these wars contributed to the broader economic uncertainty that helped deepen the recession. War, debt and economic weakness therefore became connected parts of a wider crisis.

Between integration and fragmentation

It would not be the first time in recent history that international relations were reorganised between the poles of integration and fragmentation. Global cooperation and regional unity can expand while states break apart and political communities separate.

After the end of the First World War, the creation of the League of Nations and the attempt to establish a system of shared security in Europe opened a promising period of international diplomacy.

The hope was that international institutions could contain future conflicts and create lasting cooperation between states. That hope was weakened by the global economic crisis that began at the end of the nineteen twenties.

Authoritarian governments gained influence, economic isolation increased and national interests displaced the willingness to accept shared responsibility. Governments that had come to power through elections could also develop authoritarian structures.

Political insecurity encouraged a return to power politics, unilateral foreign policy and economic separation. The process eventually led to a new period of war and showed that international institutions are insufficient when states place their own interests above common rules.

The unresolved question of the future

The future may be shaped by the further fragmentation of existing states and by attempts to settle conflicts through separate agreements. It is equally possible that shared dangers will encourage stronger integration.

The existence of international organisations, the growth of regional alliances and worldwide economic and technical connection all support the possibility of greater cooperation.

Many problems cannot be solved by a single state. These include economic crises, energy supply, international crime, terrorism and the consequences of changing environmental conditions.

Political leaders regularly affirm their support for shared responsibility and cooperation at international meetings. Yet such declarations often fail when concrete national interests are affected.

As soon as governments face a choice between common rules and domestic advantage, they frequently place national interests first. The gap between public declarations and political practice remains one of the central weaknesses of international cooperation.

The rise of economic patriotism

Since the beginning of the present century, many governments have embraced economic patriotism. France has tried to protect companies considered strategically important, Russia has brought major parts of its energy industry under stronger state influence and the United States has introduced protective measures whenever domestic producers faced unwanted competition.

Although free trade forms an important basis of European integration, protection of national industries has spread. Governments increasingly treat certain companies, resources and economic sectors as too important to be exposed fully to open competition.

When economic conditions worsen, the wish to shield national markets and reduce unemployment becomes stronger. As economic confidence declines, national self-interest often becomes more influential.

Cooperation between states and the ideals of open markets are then pushed into the background. Governments promise protection from foreign competition while attempting to preserve the advantages of international trade.

This combination is contradictory. A state cannot benefit without limits from open markets while trying to avoid every consequence of international competition.

Opening and closing at the same time

Periods of economic opening and periods of political and economic separation have repeatedly followed each other throughout history. They do not always appear in a simple sequence.

Opposing developments can take place at the same time. Since the end of the twentieth century, European integration has expanded through larger markets and closer cooperation, while states that once belonged to common economic areas have broken apart.

The Yugoslav federation collapsed, as did the Soviet Union. While parts of Europe moved closer together, other political spaces divided into smaller states and new national units.

Historical gains and losses often seem to balance each other. Progress in one area may be connected with serious setbacks in another.

Globalisation can encourage prosperity and exchange, but it can also increase inequality and dependence. National separation may promise short-term protection while creating economic isolation and political tension in the longer term.

The enduring questions of nationalism

The British historian Tony Judt examined the political and social experiences of the twentieth century and explored the gains and losses associated with globalisation and nationalism.

His work raised questions about the forces that make world wars possible, produce totalitarian beliefs and drive societies towards destruction.

The central questions concern every generation. What can be learned from history, and what does it mean to live a good life?

Sometimes the comfort of a wealthy society produces arrogance and overconfidence. In other cases, revolt grows from poverty, exclusion and the absence of future prospects.

Natural events can also disturb social orders. Droughts, floods and failed harvests have repeatedly caused political unrest, population movements and the collapse of established authority.

Social stability is never based solely on political decisions. It also depends on economic conditions, natural resources and the ability of institutions to respond to sudden change.

The ancient fear of destruction

In earlier times, prophets announced the destruction of the known world. Today, experts develop scenarios in which monetary collapse, social disaster or environmental crisis brings about the end of familiar civilisation.

The story of the great flood appears in many religions and cultures. From India to the civilisations of Central America, traditions describe a destructive force of water that destroys an old world and allows a new order to emerge.

Water therefore represents both destruction and cleansing. The end is not merely a final disappearance but also a transition into a different condition.

The Epic of Gilgamesh, among the oldest great works of human culture, contains motifs that later appeared in biblical traditions. These include the creation of humanity, conflict between gods and people and punishment through natural forces.

The idea of an approaching apocalypse appears to be as old as humanity itself. Certain points of transition, especially the beginning of a new millennium, can awaken collective fears, religious journeys and the desire to store food and other necessities.

Faith in progress and fear of decline

People who have experienced major upheavals and reflected on them intellectually often describe their age with unusual intensity. Stefan Zweig remembered a Europe that had initially been carried by enormous intellectual and technical achievements before falling into unimaginable depths of violence.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, a strong mood of progress prevailed. Technical development created the impression that almost anything could be achieved.

This belief produced great self-confidence. Anyone who warned of the dangers of progress could easily be dismissed as backward, fearful or disloyal.

Oswald Spengler was among the sceptics. He understood history as a cycle of growth, maturity and decline and tried to draw conclusions for his own age from that interpretation.

Many contemporaries rejected Spengler’s view. Nevertheless, his example shows that cultural pessimism does not always result from ignorance. At times, the pessimist recognises developments that others refuse to see because they are carried away by enthusiasm for progress.

The long nineteenth century and the short twentieth century

The historian Eric Hobsbawm developed the idea of a long nineteenth century and a short twentieth century. In this interpretation, the nineteenth century began with the French Revolution and ended with the outbreak of the First World War.

The violent age of extremes lasted from the beginning of the First World War until the fall of the Iron Curtain. This interpretation shows that historical time cannot be understood only through calendar periods.

Political, economic and intellectual upheavals often shape the character of an age more strongly than the change from one calendar year to the next.

The decisive transformation does not always lie in a single event. It often emerges from a chain of crises, technical developments, wars and political decisions.

Only in retrospect can these developments be arranged into an apparently clear historical period.

The security of the age before the Great War

The long period before the First World War was not only an age of dynamism but also an age of security. State administration, economic growth and the feeling of living within an ordered multinational empire provided stability for many people.

This security was regarded as a desirable and lasting achievement. Anyone who questioned it could be dismissed as a pessimist.

In the eyes of many contemporaries and later readers, Oswald Spengler represented such pessimism. Yet he may simply have recognised more clearly what others did not want to accept.

A warning may prove correct even when nobody believes it at the time. Cassandra from Greek mythology remains the best-known example of a figure whose warnings were rejected despite their truth.

The people of Troy opened their city to the wooden horse that brought about their destruction. Many powers that were once regarded as invincible have created the conditions for their own decline in a similar manner.

The present mood of decline

Anyone examining current interpretations of historical change encounters a renewed mood of decline. Writers speak of the possible weakening of the West, the arrival of an Asian age, the fragmentation of Europe and the collapse of familiar political structures.

Globalisation, once regarded by many as an answer to nearly every political and economic problem, appears to have reached its limits. Yet the world was already interconnected in earlier centuries, even though the technology and culture of that time were different.

Trade routes, migration and cultural exchange connected continents long before modern communication. The present differs mainly through greater speed, technical reach and the immediate availability of information.

The belief that our age is completely unique can therefore be as misleading as the claim that every earlier development will repeat itself without change.

History contains both repetition and invention. Similar pressures can produce different outcomes because people respond under different political, technical and cultural conditions.

Economic connection does not prevent war

Economic connection alone cannot guarantee peaceful coexistence. Before the First World War, the British economist Norman Angell argued that a major European war was difficult to imagine because the economies of the leading states were so closely linked.

His reasoning was that war would damage all participants and would therefore be politically irrational.

Events showed that economic calculation does not automatically defeat national passion, military planning and political hostility. Despite advanced international trade and financial connection, war still broke out.

The old European order that dominated world trade collapsed. Commercial dependence and economic closeness could not prevent military conflict.

History therefore shows that economic interdependence is not enough to make war impossible. Political decisions can overcome economic interests when states value security, honour or national greatness more highly.

The desire for complete protection

Like the period before the First World War, the present is marked by a strong desire for complete protection. In the English-speaking and German-speaking worlds, many people believe that almost every risk should be covered by insurance.

During the final decade of the twentieth century, insurance companies made large profits from life insurance and became important financial institutions. Later, declining interest rates made it more difficult to achieve the returns promised by many contracts.

Despite this, insurance companies continue to enjoy considerable trust, especially in German-speaking countries. Banks, by contrast, have lost much of their former reputation.

Many people believe that their savings, retirement income and long-term claims are permanently secure. Monetary crises, bank failures or the collapse of state finances could challenge these assumptions.

The belief in complete safety is as fragile as the belief that political and economic systems can continue without serious breaks.

The society that constantly seeks a diagnosis

Historians, essayists and public commentators often feel compelled to provide their age with a comprehensive diagnosis. We may already live in a society that continually declares new historical periods and assigns new names to every major change.

Such interpretations attract attention for a while. Once events move in a different direction, however, some publications and theories quickly appear empty.

The end of history did not occur. The great cultural conflict expected by some observers did not become a permanent reality. Nor did a completely peaceful world order arise in which every state respected international law equally.

The post-industrial society announced by sociologists during the last century also did not emerge in the expected form. Industrial production did not disappear. It moved to different regions, changed its methods and became connected with new technical fields.

The value of a historical diagnosis depends on whether it remains open enough to allow surprises. Those who attempt to describe the future too precisely often mistake a present tendency for an unchangeable law.

The artificial boundaries of historical periods

The word chronology comes from Chronos, the Greek god associated with time. Since ancient times, historians have felt the need to divide time and distinguish one period from another.

Such categories can be useful, but they do not always reflect lived experience. The division into antiquity, the Middle Ages, modern history and the contemporary period contains many boundaries that are artificial.

A person trying to survive war, disease and hunger in central Europe during the seventeenth century did not know that later historians would describe that lifetime through the name of a particular war.

For the people themselves, history did not consist of clearly separated sections. They experienced change gradually, with contradictions and without knowing what meaning later generations would give to their lives.

Future generations will probably divide our own period differently from the way people today expect.

What name will future generations choose?

It is uncertain under which heading later generations will place the present. They may speak of a long transition, a political reorganisation, an economic collapse or an unexpected renewal.

Many people feel uneasy, while others hope to witness fundamental changes in politics, economics and society. They seek a way out of crisis, corruption and growing inequality.

Much may continue for a long time despite all tensions. The shortage of important resources, difficult economic conditions and the anger of many people may lead to a political turning point, but they do not have to do so.

History rarely moves in a straight line. Developments can continue slowly for years and then accelerate through an event that initially appears unimportant.

It is equally possible that some fears are exaggerated and that political institutions will adapt to new conditions without completely collapsing.

Why the future remains open

The question of whether a culture is destined to decline, or whether the world is moving from a European age towards an Asian or later African age, will continue to be asked.

No final answer is possible. It remains useful to place current developments within a historical context while remembering that life is full of surprises.

Inventions can reverse expectations that have lasted for decades. Predicted disasters may fail to appear, while unexpected dangers may arise.

At the end of the nineteenth century, some people warned that Paris would soon be buried under horse manure. The invention of the motor car changed the transport system, while the remaining manure became useful as fertiliser.

During the fourteenth century, widespread deforestation in central Europe appeared to threaten the disappearance of large areas of woodland. The increased use of stone in construction and the later use of coal changed that development.

These examples show that predictions are limited by the technical possibilities of their own time. People can sometimes solve problems by changing the conditions that created them.

Breaks instead of straight lines

It would therefore be wrong to believe in a completely linear development. Breaks can be caused by political decisions, technical inventions, social movements or natural forces.

Nature has always played a role in history. Droughts, floods, earthquakes, epidemics and changes in the climate can disturb political orders and force entire societies to respond to new conditions.

In the end, however, people influence the direction of history through knowledge, hope and courage.

They can correct mistakes, develop technical solutions, change political alliances and create new forms of cooperation in response to crisis.

A period of transition does not necessarily have to end in decline. It may also become the beginning of a new order whose shape emerges only slowly.

The image of broken mirrors

A Persian story illustrates this possibility. When the Persian ruler Nasr-Eddin visited Europe during the nineteenth century, he was said to have been so impressed by the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles that he ordered many mirrors for his palace.

When the crates arrived in Tehran, the delicate glass had been broken into fragments. The craftsmen at the ruler’s court did not allow themselves to be discouraged.

They used the broken pieces to decorate the halls of the Golestan Palace. The fragments became part of a new creation, even though the result looked completely different from the work originally intended.

This image can be applied to political and social upheaval. Orders can collapse, expectations can prove false and familiar structures can lose their former shape.

The fragments do not necessarily have to become worthless. New connections, new institutions and new forms of shared responsibility can emerge from them.

The present age is marked by uncertainty, but uncertainty also creates room for renewal. The future will depend on whether societies respond to crisis through fear and separation or through courage, responsibility and cooperation.

It may therefore be possible to create something new from the current turbulence and the many political and territorial changes. The new order may not resemble the old one, but it can still develop its own form and leave a lasting mark on history.